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Abstract
Shipbreaking is a sustainable industry, carried out under non-
sustainable conditions. To those working in the industry on the
beaches of India and Bangladesh, it represents employment and
an important supply of resources for recycling, this, however, at a
very high cost in terms of environmental and human health. To
the ship owners, it represents a good income from the sale of
end-of life ships and the avoidance of the "polluter pays" and
other principles.
The article examines the background to this migrant
industry, where hazardous waste follows the line of least
resistance. It considers existing legislation on transboundary
movements of hazardous waste and the strong polarisation of
opinion regarding its interpretation. It also looks at several high
profile cases of ships being exported for scrapping and the
growing number of court decisions regarding the acceptability of
this trade. Finally, it considers the issue of various voluntary
guidelines and the move to produce an international convention
on shipbreaking that is to demand mandatory compliance.
Introduction
The shipping industry facilitates the movement of most of the
world's trade and international shipping has become a truly global
industry. Cumulative advances in technology have resulted in the
construction of increasingly large and complex vessels, but their lives are
still largely determined primarily by the swings in trade and the demand
for shipping capacity. Ultimately most ships end their days at the hands of
breakers and until recent years their disposal was not a matter of public
concern until the issue was successfully raised by environmentally
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conscious individuals and groups. Shipbreaking - also known as ship
scrapping/wrecking/disposalldismantling, and increasingly the more
benign and anodyne "ship recycling" - is now the subject of growing
international concern, with strong polarisation of the opposing groups.
Shipbreaking is essentially a question of economics. Ships are
designed, constructed and operated in an environment of high technology
and extensive legislative provisions. Their disposal is usually undertaken
in circumstances at quite the opposite end of the spectrum, in an
environment of low cost, very low technology, high labour content, high
risk, and against a background of either inadequate, or more likely,
inadequately enforced, legislation. The International Labour Organisation
(lLO) now rates shipbreaking as one of the world's most dangerous
occupations. 1
The high level of regulation that pertains to working ships comes to
an abrupt halt once vessels become surplus to requirements and they pass
to the hands of the breakers. This transition represents a quite positive,
final cash inflow to former owners from the sale of redundant vessels. At
the same time, it allows them to draw a distinct line under their
responsibilities for the high levels of hazardous waste that such vessels
now represent, and to circumvent a whole range of legal principles such as
the polluter pays, proximity, and precautionary principles.
Background
Shipbreaking had been traditionally carried out around the world,
with ships often being scrapped in the places in which they were built. For
a period, the UK and the USA became pre-eminent in breaking until the
1950s, when the market moved to the Mediterranean countries and, by the
1970s, to Taiwan and South Korea, with their low labour costs, high
demand for scrap metal and low levels of regulatory control. By the 1980s,
non-Asian countries were unable to compete with these areas. Currently
the market for old ships is dominated by India and Bangladesh, and China,
with Turkey taking a number of the smaller vessels each year. The export
and dumping of toxic waste ultimately follows the line ofleast resistance.
The beaches of Alang, India, and Chittagong, Bangladesh, have
become the focus of activity for the breaking of ships, since the long
sloping inter-tidal zones and the high tidal ranges allow ships to beached
for breaking where they rest. Unfortunately, this is a situation, which
I IMF 2003 at www.imlinctal.org/main/index.cfin?n~47&1~2&c~8238 viewed at 22.8.08
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offers least control over waste containment and spillages. 2 Much of the
work is carried out by hand by a large labour force, unregulated and with
minimal resources in terms of equipment, medical care, representation or
social provisions. Some 15-20% of the workers at the Bangladesh sites are
reckoned to be below the age of 15.3 A report by India's Supreme Court in
2006 indicated that 16% of workers on the Alang beaches suffers from
asbestosis. 4 Mechanised dock and material handling equipment is largely
absent and only China has made some move towards breaking ships
alongside, on the Yangtze and Pearl Rivers.
These centres are in strong competition with one another; in 2006,
only 15 or so of the 173 yards in Alang remained in operation because of
competition from Bangladesh and China. 5 Dominance is determined not
only by the number and types of ships coming for disposal, but also
changes in local taxation, local enforcement of whatever regulations may
obtain, and particularly the national demand for scrap. This demand often
emanates from the building programmes of the country, since the bulk of
the steel from the ships is usually directed to the local rolling mills for
conversion to rebar for use in the construction industry. Bangladesh has
become pre-eminent in the breaking of large Very Large, and Ultra Large
Crude Carriers (VLCCs and ULCCs), largely as a result of its lax
enforcement of gas-free certification of ships prior to cutting. The recent
massive boom in the Chinese construction industry has resulted in the high
prices offered for end-of-life ships by China, attracting many ships that
otherwise would have gone elsewhere for disposal. The Pakistan
shipbreaking centre at Gaddani, once a major centre of shipbreaking, has
now almost ceased operations, due to the high prices of surplus ships and
the high level of import duties. 6
Typically, ships are sold by owners to intermediary cash buyers. For
years, prices fluctuated between US$IOO and US$200 per lightweight
displacement tons (Idt)/ but a period of low supply of ships, plus high
demand from China can raise prices to over US$500. A VLCC might
command a price of US$5-1 0 million and more, depending on other metals
2 DEFRA 2006. Overview ofthe ship recycling process in the UK p59 DEFRA 2006. Overview ofthe ship
recycling process in the UKp13
3 International Federation for Human Rights 2008 Childbreaking yards. Child labour in the ship recycling
industry in Bangladesh. at www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/bgukreport.pdfviewed 4.1 0.200R
4 International Federation of Human Rights 2006 at www. fidh.org/spip.php?article 3873 viewed at 21.8.2008
5 sse News 13.2.2006 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/4708530.stm
6 Caddani Ship-breaking at www.lasbeIadistrictgovt.com/gaddani/ship/%20brcaking.htm viewed 3.9.2008
7 Light displacement tons - essentially a measure of the fabric of the ship. only employed when a ship goes for
recycling.
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and equipment present; the presence of hazardous materials on board
appears to be irreJevant.8
Although the wide fluctuations in scrap prices can have distinct
adverse effects on the different breaking sites and their workers, the views
of the finance providers for many of the sales may be somewhat less
concerned, the website of First International Merchant Bank cited their
view of the trade as:
... a recession proof business (which) actually does better in times
of world recession. The terrorism of September II, which
exacerbated the world economic slowdown has led to an increase
in the volume of scrap ship finance business for FIMBank... We
cover ourselves with full insurance. 9
Despite a number of both ratified, and as yet to be ratified,
conventions on the banning of the use of a number of specific substances,
ships are still arriving at the breakers ladened with asbestos,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)10, radioactive materials, heavy metals,
tributyl tin (TBT)11 and chloroflurocarbons (CFCs) 12etC., incorporated
throughout the ships' structure. Although the use of asbestos and PCBS
have been prohibited for many years and a TBT ban is awaiting sufficient
signatories before coming into effect, many of the ships arriving for
disposal are of an age where they still contain large amounts of these
substances. Oil, fuel and bunker residues may also be present in large
amounts, as well as contaminated bilge wastes. As many vessels are sailed
(as distinct from towed) to their final destination, oil and fuel may remain
on board in significant quantities.
Cutting usually begins with the creation of large openings into the
ship's hull to create both access points and allow venting of fumes.
However, the cutting may be into compartments or pipes that still contain
inflammable materials or are fume-heavy, and fires and explosions are
commonplace. India now enforces gas-free certification more formally,
8 Commission of the European Communities 2007 Green Paper on better ship dismantling. Brussels 2.2.2007
COM (2007) 269 Final p50p.cit. p5
9 www.timbank.com/prmain.asp?id~14 viewed 28.7.2004
10 PCBs are persistent carcogenic materials that bio-accumulate and are toxic to both humans and aquatic
species. When heated they generate chemicals such as polychlorinated dibenzofurans, that are even more toxic.
Their use has traditionally been in cable insulation, transformers, capacitators etc.
11 TBT is an aggressive organatin used in anti-fouling paints. It is a substance that accumulates in the blood and
is highly toxic in the aquatic environment.
12 CFCs are non-toxic substances, but problematic in the atmosphere where their reaction with UV light
contributes to ozone depletion. Although their use on board in refrigerants, solvents and fire extinguishing
agents is now obsolete, they may still be present on many ships.
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but this can add significantly to costs. At the board or enquiry after an
explosion on a ship killed 50 (or more) workers in May 2000, Judge
Mohammad Harisuddin described the process of dealing with some of the
residues:
To clean tankers, workers cut windows in the bottom of the hull
and let sea water. .. in at high tide to wash out the hydrocarbon
residues ... Residues are collected for re-sale if their quality is
good enough. In some cases, residues are simply discharged to
the sea. 13
Large sections of the ship are cut away, usually starting from the
bows. These sections are towed up the beach and are cut into smaller
pieces, either by torch or by hammer and chisel for the rolling mills.
Asbestos is frequently removed by hand; the prevalence of asbestosis
amongst the workers is high and asbestos may be found in the living
quarters of the workers. 14 Many wastes may be burned on the beach,
including electrical cabling, which is burned to remove the covering from
the copper core, the process producing toxic fumes of dioxins and furans.
A series of reports by Greenpeace, in association with organisations such
as Oet Norske Veritas (ONV), define in detail the extent to which
pollution exists in the major ship breaking areas of Alang and Mumbai
(India), Chiang Jiang (China), Aliaga (Turkey). 15 Repeat visit reports
indicate no improvement in the situation.
At the same time, ship breaking in these areas may be regarded as a
very sustainable industry in terms of the high level of recycling that it
practices. A ship may typically consist of around 95% of mild steel, and
often accounts for a very high percentage of scrap for recycling in the
absence of other local resources; some 80-90% of Bangladesh's steel
output originated from end-of-life ships.16 Further, the ships' fittings and
ancillary equipment are also recycled at a much higher level than would be
the case in, for example, the UK, and many shops, selling a wide range of
items from redundant ships line the road to Alang. The industry also offers
employment to a huge migrant population from the poorer states, at rates
13 Judge Mohammad Harisuddin, heading the board of enquiry on the explosion in the tanker Dena, in May
2000.
14 Greenpeace 2001. Shipsjor scrap 111 Steel and toxic wastesjor Asia. p5
15 See for example, Greenpeace reports ShipsjiJr scrap: steel and toxic wastes/i" Asia (1999). Ships/or scrap
11 (/999), Ships/or scrap III and IV(200I), Ships/or scrap V (2002).
16 Commission ofthc European Communities 2007 op.cit. p2
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that are low l7 but still better than may be found in the more traditional
occupations such as farming. All these returns, however, come at a very
high cost to both human and environmental health, with extensive
pollution of the local sea, inter-tidal zone, beaches and surrounding land
areas, especially by persistent and bio-accumulative substances.
Legal Provisions
There exists a range of regulatory provisions relating to the shipping
and shipbreaking industries. These provisions are extensive and include
both a number of international conventions, differing national legislation
and customary law, but the application and enforcement are not consistent.
Applicability is made more difficult by the fact that ships are able to move
freely between jurisdictions, and ownership can be transferred easily and
even while vessels are at sea.
A ban or limit is in effect on a number of substances traditionally
used in ship construction; nevertheless these substances are still present on
many vessels coming for disposal. Top of the list of hazardous materials is
asbestos, used as a thermal insulation, and hence found extensively in
engine rooms, but also in other areas, as lagging for pipes etc. Airborne
particles can accumulate in the lungs, causing mesothelioma and
asbestosis; restrictions on the use of asbestos date from 1989 in the USA
and in Europe from 1987. 18 Following closely behind asbestos, although
usually in much reduced quantities, are PCBs, persistent carcogenic
materials that bioaccumulate and are toxic to aquatic species as well as
humans. PCBs can be still found in a wide range of applications, including
cable insulation, transformers, capacitators etc. The production of PCBs
was halted in 1979 in the USA and in much of Europe in 1978-82. There is
a global campaign to prohibit the use of PCBs and their trade is regulated
by both the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions. 19
Other frequent hazards include CFCs, which are often found in
refrigeration equipment and solvents and their reduction, together with
17 Whilst the costs of labourers in European shipbreaking sites is around US$250 per day, costs in Bangladesh
and India, where health and safety expenses are negligible, are just US$I-2 per day. Commission of the
European Communities 2007 Green paper an better ship dismantling COM(2007) 269 Final 22.5.2007 p6
18 Counci! Directive 87/217/££C of 19 March 1987 on the prevention and reduction o(environmental pollution
by asbestos as amended by Counci! Directive 91/692/££C (Iimher amended bv Counci! Regulation
1882/2003/£C), and Counci! Regulation 807/2003/EC OJ L 85 28.3.87 p40
19 The Rotterdam Convention on the prior infonned consent for certain hazardous chemicals and pesticide in
international trade 1989 and the Stockholm Convention on persistent organic pollutants 200 I.
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other substances that deplete the ozone layer, have been the subject of an
international treaty since 1987.20
An international convention banning the use of harmful organatins
such as TBT has been defined, but is not yet in force until ratified by 25
states representing at least 25% of the world's merchant tonnage,21
however, the use of anti-fouling measures is covered in Europe by
Regulation 782/2003.22
Legislation relating directly to ship design and construction has, in
the past, been the direct result of specific maritime accidents, which
usually involved extensive oil pollution. The sinking of the tanker Torrey
Canyon in 1987 led to requirements for double-hulled tankers to be
incorporated into the MARPOL 73/78 Convention,23 whilst the grounding
of the oil tanker Exxon Valdez off Alaska in 1989 resulted in the passing of
the US Oil Pollution Act 1990 (OPA 90). The latter resulted in a ban on
the use of single-hulled tankers in US waters, forcing these vessels to seek
alternative markets. Both the IMO and USA measures, plus the difficulties
of rebuilding single-hulled vessels and the 25-30 year age limit imposed
on tankers, have resulted in the phasing out of single-hulled tankers.
The grounding and breaking up of the oil tanker Erika in 1999, the
break up of the aging tanker Prestige in 2003, and the extensive pollution
that they generated, accelerated the IMO phase-out of single-hulled
tankers by 2007 and 20 IS (depending on category). In March 2000, the
European Commission adopted the Erika I measure to speed up this
process and strengthen port control. EC Regulations 417/2002/EC24
contained the double-hull provisions for European ship owners. The
Prestige accident promoted the reduction of previous scrapping deadlines
to 2005 and 2010. One result of these new measures is an anticipated peak
in scraping for which the existing industry does not have capacity and
which therefore promotes other states even further on the margin, to enter
the industry.
With regard to the classification of scrap and the international trade
in hazardous waste, there are predominantly two pieces of legislation
currently in effect, namely the United Nation's Basel Convention25 and the
20 The 1985 Vienna Convention for the protection of the ozone layer and the 1987 Montreal Protocol.
21 International Convention on the control ofhannful anti-fouling systems on ships 2001.
22 Regulation EC 782/2003 on the prohibition of organotin compounds on ships OJ L 115/1 9.5.2003
23 Amendments to Regulation 13G of Annex I of MARPOL adopted 27.4.01 by the 46th session of the IMO
Marine Environmental Committee (MEPC-46)
24 Regulation 417/2002/EC on the accelerated phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design requirements for
single hull oil tankers and repealing Council Regulation 2978/94/EC
25 The Basel Convention on the control of transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal
1989
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European Waste Shipment Regulation (EWSR).26 The Basel Convention
was adopted in 1989 in response to the rising trend of toxic wastes being
shipped to developing countries and to Eastern Europe. Its central concept
is one of 'environmentally sound management' (ESM) aimed at protecting
human and environmental health. It is the most frequently quoted source in
arguments concerning the status of ships-for-scrap, yet this instrument was
not developed with ships specifically in mind, and although this in itself
does not render it inapplicable, its applicability is considered very
contentious by many representing the shipping industry. The convention
seeks to ensure that wastes are dealt with where possible within the
country of source (the proximity principle), by employing a system of
Prior Informed Consent (PIC)27 and written notification of movements by
the exporting state to the state of import, which may refuse the shipment.
The Basel "ban" amendment28 was adopted in 1995, and prohibits
the export of hazardous waste from Annex VII countries (Basel
Convention Parties that are members of the EU, OECD, Liechtenstein) to
non-Annex VII countries (all other Parties to the Convention), irrespective
of whether the waste is destined for disposal or recovery. This amendment
is not yet in force, although its provisions have been incorporated in the
European Waste Shipment Regulation and hence have the force of law for
members of the EU.
The convention has been ratified by 168 countries, including the
UK, India, Bangladesh, China and others, but not by the USA, which often
displays a reluctance to ratify treaties to which it has been a signatory. The
convention may represent a very real increase in liabilities and commercial
costs to owners were ships to be decontaminated prior to despatch. The
lack of precise definition regarding end-of-life ships has led to some
interesting examples of creative interpretation by some of the parties
involved.
Opinions differ as to when a ship might be deemed 'waste'.
Proponents of the Basel Convention, principally Greenpeace and the Basel
Action Network (BAN)29 consider that a ship becomes waste immediately
the decision to scrap is made (a point difficult to define and easy to
conceal), whilst the shipping industry, as represented by the International
26 Council Regulation 259/93/EEC on the supervision of the shipments of waste within the European
Community 1993.as amended 0.1 L30 6.2.1993
27 Basel Convention, Article 6
28 Formally incorporated at the 2nd Conference of Parties 1995.
29 BAN is an organisation devoted to "confronting the global environmental injustice and economic
inefficiency oftoxic trade (toxic wastes, products and technologies) and its devastating impacts." Its activities
are not limited to shipbreaking.
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Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the International Maritime Organisation
(IMO), is equally adamant that a ship en route to the breakers does not
become waste until its ultimate arrival at the breakers.
In evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee in 2003,
the ICS argued that the Basel Convention was intended to apply only to
land-based wastes; it was never intended to apply to ships. The
Environment Agency deemed it "extremely problematic", whilst
Greenpeace, in accepting the difficulties, argued that:
of all the instruments currently in place that impact this issue, the
Basel Convention is the only one that is a) legally binding and
b) in a clear position to actually minimise the export of ships
containing hazardous materials to developing countries, and
thus ... prevent more impoverished workers from being poisoned
or otherwise killed30
In a submission to the IMO and the ILO Working Group31 on the subject,
BAN stated that:
... it is well recognised that the unique nature of ships makes it
easy to circumvent the intent and spirit of the letter of the
Convention unless imperative guidelines, decisions and
mechanisms are agreed.
Despite repeated rebuttals by the ICS, the Basel Convention at its Seventh
Conference of Parties in 2005 passed Decision VII/26, stating that:
... a ship may become waste as defined in Article 2 of the Basel
Convention and that at the same time it may be defined as a ship
under other international rules. 32
The conclusion of the conference was that Parties should recognise their
obligations with respect to ships as waste, minimise transboundary
30 Evidence to the Select Committee on Environment. Food and Rural Affairs. Eighteenth Report HC 834
11.11.04 Dismantling De/lmet Ships in the UK.
31 JointlLO/lMO/BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping. 1sl. session 7.2.05, London
32 Basel Convention Decision VIl/26, recital 6; Regulation (EC) 1013/2006 of the European Parliament and of
the Council 14 June 2006 on the shipment of waste OJ I 190, 12.7.2006, pi recital 35
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movements, and ensure prior informed consent and environmentally sound
management.33
A number of rulings by the ECl have determined that waste for
recycling remains waste right up to the point of the recycling operation
and pronouncements have been made on a diverse range of substances
such as gravel chippings in the Palin Granit and AvestiPolarit cases34 and
oil used as a fuel for heating in the joint cases of ARCO Chemie and
EPON.35 Difficult though some of the ECl rulings might have been, the
wastes in question usually have had the distinction of being basically
static. In comparison, ships-for-disposal might well be considered as
mobile waste in more than one sense.
Nevertheless, there are loopholes in the Basel provisions that are
exploited daily by shipowners wishing to dispose of redundant vessels and
these concern both the need to determine clearly the actual point of the
decision to dispose (and hence render a ship waste) plus the need to define
more closely the equivalent to "state of export" since ships can be deemed
waste in literally any location.3!> The decision to determine (i.e. declare)
when a ship becomes ready for disposal can easily be made by owners
once the vessel is on the seas and already heading for the breaker's yard.
Declaring a sale once a ship is within the waters of the country of
destination offers the potential to circumvent a transboundary movement
once it has already been completed. 37 At the point of departure from any
port, it can be - and often is - claimed that a vessel is sailing for sale to
other owners, for repairs elsewhere, or for conversion to other uses. Such
deceptions are commonplace, as some of the case law below illustrates. It
is not uncommon for ships to be renamed whilst at sea, or change flags of
registration, especially to open registers. 38 In some instances, ships may
arrive at the breakers yard flying flags of quite fictitious countries, the
former Danish ferry Riky (see below), for example, reputedly arriving at
Alang under the flag of the state of "Roxa".39
33 Kasel Convention 2005 Open-ended Working Group of the Basel Convention Fourth session Geneva 4-8
July 2005 c'nvironmentallv sound management o[ship dismantling Note by Greenpeace and the Basel Action
Network p3
34 Palin Granit Oy and Vehmassa/oJ1 kansantervcJ'sfJ'un kuntayhyman hallitus v. Lou/1ais-Suomen
Ymp{)risWkesklis C-9/00 ELR 4 3 and AvestiPolarit Chrome Oy C-114/01
35 ARCO Chemie Nederland Ud v Minister von Volkshllisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milienbeheer C-
418/97 and C-419/97 Vereniging Dorpsbelang Hees and Directuer van de dienst milieu en Water van de
province Gelderland, joined partv Elektriciteitsproducliemaatschapij Osst-enNoord-Nederland [I 997j Env I.R
36/J
36 Basel Convention 2005 op,cit, pS
37 Greenpcacc 1999 Shiphreaking and the Basel Con'venfio!1 - an ana~"vsis.
3S Formerly more commonly know as Flags of Convenience
39 G Krishna 2006 The scrapping ofRikv at www.lndiatogetheLorg/2006/mar/env-riky.htm#eont viewed
20XOS
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The difficulty of detennining waste and responsibilities is further
aggravated by the ease with which ownership may change quickly and
frequently, with ship owners selling redundant vessels to cash buyers,
intermediaries between sellers and the eventual owners, the breakers.
Legal responsibilities are easily hidden at any number of points by the use
of fictitious companies, or by companies which may exist only as Post Box
registrations or "filing cabinet companies" (see below), such practices
being condoned by some of the more questionable open register states,
whose adherence to operating standards can be well below internationally
accepted norms.
On the other hand, the 'Basel ban' has been quite unambiguously
incorporated into European legislation, via Articles 14 and 16 of the
European Waste Shipment Regulation 1993 as amended, making it
binding on the ships under the flags of all Member States and ships
arriving at, and departing from, their ports. Waste is defined under
Community law as any subject or object in the categories set out in Annex
I to the Waste Framework Directive,40 'which the holder discards or
intends or is required to discard.' Ships that contain significant quantities
of waste are to be considered hazardous waste and dismantling is to be
carried out under environmentally sound management in an OECD
country. The alternative is to have ships pre-cleaned or decontaminated
prior to departure. This interpretation was further confirmed by the
decision of the French Conseil d'Etat with respect to the aircraft carrier Le
Clemenceau (see below).41
At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that there are
difficulties beyond simple health, environment, and cost issues associated
with pre-cleaning; a complete removal of all hazardous materials
incorporated into a ship's structure may involve dismantling to the point
where insurance is no longer available or the ship no longer sea worthy.
There is also a distinct shortage of ocean-going tugs that could undertake
long-distance dead toWS. 42
Case Law Arising
A number of decisions have been held by various national courts on
the subject of ships as hazardous waste and their acceptability in their
40 Directive 2006//2/EC olthe lo'uropean Parliament and olthe Council ol5 IIpril 2006 on waste OJ L 114,
27A.2006 p9
41 Commission of the European Communities 2007 op.cit. p4
42 ENDS 2006 Shipbuilders prepare to move into recycling Report 377 June 2006 p21
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uncleaned (contaminated) state. The number is still relatively small, but is
growing apace and illustrates the determination by some organisations and
by some governments to define what is no longer acceptable. The
decisions also illustrate the extent to which some governments will act at
odds with their own national courts and the legal contortions employed. In
each of the cases, the environmental pressure group Greenpeace has
played a major role in raising awareness of what was being proposed in the
way of illegal trade in hazardous waste. The cases also illustrate the ease
in which owners can evade their responsibilities by abandonment of
vessels, last-minute sales and ship renaming, and by the hiding or
obscuring of their identities, a practice facilitated by a number of open
registers. The role of open register states should not be underestimated
here as in other matters. Open registers now account for the majority of
registered flag tonnage; as a consequence, the open register states play an
important role within the IMO in the development (or perhaps the lack of
development) of new and existing regulations and their enforcement. The
five cases examined below are just some of the more significant high-
profile cases amongst the many that now occur with increasing regularity.
a. The Sandrien
The Sandrien, a chemical tanker flying the flag of Mauritius, was
detained in Amsterdam, where it was arrested by the Dutch Environmental
Inspectorate in February 2001. Inspection had revealed serious corrosion,
which required major repair before the vessel would be allowed to sail
directly to its final destination, and without cargo. Before the ship was able
to depart, it was determined by the authorities that the purpose of its final
voyage was scrapping in Asia. The ruling of the Court of First Instance in
the Council of State, the Hague in June 200243 was that the ship as a whole
should be regarded as hazardous waste since it contained a substantial
amount of asbestos (as well as other hazardous substances and cargo
residues), thus putting the hull in the red list rather than the green waste
list categories of both the ESWR and Basel.
It was further held that the owner's intentions to transfer the ship to
Alang (a contract made in November 2002 and thus rendering the ship
waste at that time) without due notice was also in contravention of the
43 Council of State. The Hague. Upperton Ltd. V the Minister o/Housing. Spatial Planning and the
Environment. UN numher AE431 aCase number 200 I05168/2
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ESWT, in the light of the ruling on what constitutes waste, given by the
ECJ on the joined cases C-418/97 and C-419/97 .44
The Sandrien had been abandoned by her owners, who were
registered at a Post Box in Mauritius and who were contactable only
through lawyers. After occupying a berth in Amsterdam since 2000, the
ship was finally broken up in the port in 2004, the cost being borne by the
ministries and the city of Amsterdam, but not recovered from the owners.
The case was significant in that not only was it the first case in
which it was defined that a ship containing asbestos is to be treated as
hazardous waste, but it also demonstrated how difficult it can be to define
the actual ownership of a vessel and how easy it can be for owners to
simply abandon their responsibilities - a situation that needs to be
addressed directly and remedied in any forthcoming IMO legislation.
b. The Sea Beirut
Whilst sailing under the Liberian flag, the Sea Beirut broke down
off the autonomous port of Dunkirk in 1999 and was, by formal letter of
abandonment, eventually abandoned to the port by her owners, Lane
Holding SA, another Post Box-registered owner (the actual owners were
never traced). The port authorities thus became responsible for the ship.
Asbestos was found on board, although no action was taken by the port
following the assessment. The abandonment of the ship rendered it waste;
the presence of asbestos on board rendered it hazardous waste.
The ship was auctioned off by the port and bought by the German
company MSK, a front for the Turkish ship breaking company CESMAN.
It left Dunkirk in April 2002, ostensibly for scrapping, but in fact destined
for breaking at CESMAN's yard at Aliaga. No notification was given by
the port authorities to either the French or the Turkish environmental
authorities in accordance with Article 6 of the Basel Convention and the
EWSR. This despatch was also in contravention of both French and
Turkish domestic legislation. At the point of departure, France became the
country of export under Basel.
As the ship neared Aliaga, samples of materials on board were again
taken and the Turkish Environment Minister refused to accept the ship
under Turkish hazardous waste import law (itself based on Basel) and
44 See footnote 29 above for citations.
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ordered the ship to be returned to its country of departure. 45 Turkey thus
became the first country to refuse a ship for scrap on the basis of the Basel
Convention. In its turn, France refused to accept back the vessel, which in
2005 was still anchored off Aliaga. The ultimate fate of the vessel is not
known.
c. The Riky
In April 2005, Denmark took steps to prevent the scrapping of an
asbestos-contaminated ship when the 51 year old former Danish ferry
Kong Frederik IX was sold to a Post Box company, Tummel Ltd., in St
Vincent. The ship left Denmark under her new name of Frederik,
ostensibly for refurbishing in Greece. When her actual destination of
Alang was discovered, the Danish Environmental Minister wrote to her
Indian equivalent, the Minister of Environment and Forests, warning that
ship, now under the name of Riky, was due to arrive at Alang, that it be
considered illegal waste traffic under Basel, and requested that it not be
allowed to enter Indian waters but returned to Denmark for
decontamination. The vessel also reminded the Indian authorities of the
order of their own Supreme Court prohibiting the import of hazardous
waste,46 which include three provisions, namely that: prior to arrival in
port, the vessel must have proper consent from the appropriate agencies
stating that it contains no hazardous waste; the ship should have been
properly decontaminated by the owners prior to breaking; a compete
inventory of hazardous waste be available.
Repeated requests by Denmark for the ship's return were rejected by
the Indian minister, who affirmed that India had been a party to the Basel
Convention since 1992 and had strengthened its own national legislation to
ensure compliance, but that a ship sailing under its own power was not
deemed to be waste and that moreover, waste on board should be defined
purely as cargo. Hazardous material incorporated into the structure of the
ship was deemed to be of no relevance.
In October 2005, another Danish ship, the Dronning Margrethe 11,
similarly arrived at Alang illegally laden with hazardous wastes. The
Indian authorities again ignored alerts and requests by Denmark for the
return of the ship.
45 CEMSAN Ship Dismantling Metal and Steel Industry Trade Ltd. Co. v Ministry ofEnvironment;
Governorship oflzmir; Sub-Provincial Governorship Aliaga. "The Sea Beirut" Izmir 2nd Administrative Court,
Decision of30.9.2003 Decision No. 2003/1184 Case No. 2002/496
46 Writ petition No. 657 of 1995 Research Foundation for Science Technology National Resources Policy v.
Union ofmdia & Anr. SLP C No. 16175/1997 Supreme Court in a ruling.
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d. Le Clemenceau
Le Clemenceau was a large French aircraft carrier, the owners of
which spent several years trying to find a suitable base for breaking.
Decommissioned in 1997, responsibility for the ship passed from the
French Navy to the Ministry of Finance. After plans to sink the ship as an
artificial reef were abandoned in 2001 and after France's own naval
shipyard's bid was rejected as too expensive, the contract for disposal was
won by the Spanish company Gijonese de Desquaces. France had insisted
that the ship remained its property until it was completely scrapped and
that all hazardous waste had to be removed in Gijon, Spain (in accordance
with European waste regulations) before the ship could leave for Alang.47
The ship represented a major asset to a breaker as it contained an estimated
yield of 22,000 tons of steel, despite many tons of the usual toxic wastes.
In 2003 the ship, now officially known as Q790, left Toulon headed
for Turkey but was blocked by the French navy. Attempts later that year to
remove the visible asbestos first in Italy and then in Greece prior to its
intended export to Bangladesh were both failures, the Greek military
boarding the ship in the Mediterranean and forcing it to return to France.
By now the ship, owned by the Panamanian company Shipping
Decommissioning Industry Corporation (SDIC), had become an
international cause celebre. The ship was eventually returned to Toulon,
where further unsuccessful attempts were made to decontaminate the
vessel. Finally, in 2005, a court ruling48 allowed the ship to depart for India
for breaking in December, the court claiming that the matter was beyond
its jurisdiction, since the ship was deemed to remain a warship until it was
completely scrapped and hence beyond the provisions of the Basel rules on
hazardous waste exports.49
By January 2006, the ship had reached the Suez Canal, where it was
detained for a week whilst Egypt requested details on the waste on board
from the French authorities in accordance with the Basel COP7 Decision -
(see footnote 30). Numerous claims and counter claims have been made
about the mix and extent of hazardous materials involved. Meanwhile,
India's Supreme Court had determined on January 6th that the ship should
remain outside Indian waters, citing the Basel convention and pending an
47 Zarach S. 2006 The Clemenceau BIMCO. At www.bimco.org/Print.aspx?itemld~{B41363544-A707-4255­
9243-7AE5A12AF viewed 5.10.2008
48 Ruling of the Administrative Court of Paris 30.12.2005
49 Zarach S. 2006 op.cit.
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assessment by a Defence Ministry panel on the amount of toxic waste
involved. so
The following month, on February 13th , the Supreme Court sought
to set up a new advisory panel to address the issue after dismissing its
Monitoring Committee, which had submitted two contradictory reports. 51
At the same time, it issued a ban on all public debate and writing on the
affair, claiming that these represented a challenge to its authority.
Shortly afterwards, on 15th February, after complaints from
Greenpeace about contested amounts of hazardous materials on board and
in the face of impending investigation by the European Commission, the
French Supreme Court, the Conseil d'Etat, suspended the transfers2 whilst
a lower court began a review of the case. Immediately afterwards, France's
President Chirac ordered that the ship be returned to France, just days
before he began an official visit to India. s3 The question faced by the
Conseil d'Etat was whether the ship should be defined as waste and
whether its export to India was valid under Regulation 259/93. Initially the
government was adamant that the Clemenceau was not waste, but the court
considered the case against Community case law, 54
... according to which the act of disposing of is not restrained
solely to the abandonment of materials ... and must be considered
as waste materials susceptible of being used for economic
purposes, as long as they had not been regenerated or recycled
and even if the holders had the intention of recycling them. 55
A statement issued by the French government in defence of their actions
prior to the return, included the claims that it was not waste but a state-
owned ship, it was to be recycled not discarded, it was not waste but
weaponry, etc. They also claimed that the 45 tonnes of asbestos
supposedly remaining on board fell below the Basel threshold. These
claims were dismissed point by point by the BAN and others, defining
both France's and India's actions as merely 'a sad effort at revisionist
history with respect to the proper implementation of the Basel
50 Noronha F 2006. Toxic worship not allowed to disrupt India-France sammit at www.ens-
newswire.com/ens/fcb2006/2006-02-20-04.asp viewed 5.10.2008
51 Zarach S. 2006 op.e/t.
52 CE, Association Ban Ashestos France et autres, req. no. 288801,288811
53 American Society of International Law 2006 Shipbreaking and Le Clemenceau row at
www.asil.org/insights/2006/02/insights060224.htmlviewed 20.8.08
54 C-206 and 207/88 Vessuso and Zaneth, C-389/88 Zanetti
55 Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administratitive Jurisdictions of the European Union.
www.juradmin.enseminars/Brussels2008/France_en. pdf viewed at 5.10.2008
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Convention. '56 Some attempts had, however, been made to establish some
acceptable conditions for the scrapping in that the Indian yard chosen was
... an exemplary yard in line with European ISO standards.
Teams had been put in place for the transfer of technology and
necessary materials and there would have included medical
follow-ups for the workers involved. 57
The loss of the ship was a great blow to the employment prospects
of the Indian breakers since such a vessel might have taken some five
years to dismantle58 and reports in the Indian press had placed a scrap
value ofUS$IO million on the carrier.59
On 15t July 2008, the final demise of the Clemenceau was defined in
a press statement, 60 which announced that the ship was to be broken up at
Graysthorp, Hartlepool by Able UK, the Teesside company at the centre of
the Ghost Ships saga, which began in 2003 with the import of four aged
ships from the US Reserve Fleet.
e. The Blue Lady
The former liner France was one of the largest of liners operating on
the transatlantic service until the demise of that trade saw her laid up in Le
Havre until 1979, when she was sold to the Norwegian Cruise Line for
conversion to a cruise ship under the name of Norway. Although still a
popular cruise ship, the mounting cost of upgrading her to meet current
standards of the new genre of cruise ships, plus a boiler explosion on
board in 2003 finally saw the ship retired from service. From Miami, the
ship was despatched to Bremerhaven, Germany and from there the ship
was towed to Malaysia where, the German authorities were informed,
repairs would be undertaken.
The ship lay for months at anchor off the Malaysian port of Penang
waiting for a buyer. In May 2005, the ship, now under the name of Blue
Lady, left Malaysia under tow, ostensibly to be repaired in Dubai, but
56 Basel Action Network 2006 Comments on statement ofFrench government on Clemenceau by the Basel
Action Network on behalfofthe Greater Coalition demanding return o(Clemenceau 10 Francefor
decontamination. Prepared 24 January 2006
57 Zarach S. 2006 op.cil.
58 leena K 2006 Analysis; despair as Clemeneeau relurns Basel Action Network Toxic Trade News 20.2.2006
at www.ban.org/ban_news/20061060220_clemenceau_returns.htmlat 5.10.2008
59 International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development 2006. Chirae recalls asbestos-Iadened ship
from India, orders inquiry. www.ictsd.net/news/bridgesweekly/6226 viewed 5.10.2008
60 Lloyd's List Able UK wins contract 10 dismantle Clemeneeau 2.7.2008
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actually purchased by a Bangladesh breaker. However, following demands
and demonstrations by a group of environmental organisations, permission
to enter Bangladesh waters was denied by the Bangladesh government by
inter-ministerial decree, citing Basel obligations and the dangers likely to
arise from scrapping the vessel without adequate prior decontamination. 61
The buyer's letter of credit was revoked.
The ship was reportedly containing some 1,200 tons of asbestos,
plus the usually accompanying mixture of PCBs etc., but the absence of
any forma) and independent survey of the actual contents made many
numbers speculative (although a large amount of hazardous waste must
have been on board a vessel of that size).
Ultimately, the ship made its way round to the beaches of Alang in
2006. India's Supreme Court, after questionable findings of the Technical
Experts Committee on ship breaking that it established, and in
contravention of its own ruling No. 657/95,62 allowed the ship to anchor in
Indian territorial waters under "humanitarian" rather than legal arguments
in the face of oncoming monsoon weather and a low level of supplies on
board. Although by this time the ship was owned by the Indian company
Haryana Ship Demolitions Private Limited, details of ownership were
unknown to the Technical Committee. The court's logic that a ship sailing
under its own power is not waste conveniently ignored the fact that the
ship had arrived under tow.
A purely visual, two-part inspection in July 2006 by a Gujarat
Pollution Control Board committee looking for instances of loose
hazardous material on board reported only on the finding of some oily
rags, despite two previous technical reports to the contrary issued by
French companies in 2004 and 2005.63 "No other hazardous material of
any kind or quantity was found that could not safely be removed, handled
and disposed of at Alang."M The Additional Solicitor General once more
used the argument that the ship contained no asbestos or asbestos-
containing materials as cargo.
61 Gutierrez 200(1 I.egal ()hl(~ali()ns can prohihit entry oFthe Bille Lady at
www.merinews.com/catFull.jsp··artic1elD~211&category~Nation&catID~2viewed at IR.R,200R
62 Directions ojthe Supreme Court on Ship Building 657/95
63 A letter dated 16th July 2006 to the Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests Irom the CEO of Ship
Decommissioning Industries SAS, Paris advised the Ministry of a survey that the company had undertaken of
the ship at Bremcrhavcn and found extensive contamination by a range of hazardous materials, including some
1,200 tons or asbestos, some or which had been released into the atmosphere during the earlier explosion in the
boiler room. Annex 2 ofthe NGO Platrorm on Shipbreaking report 2006 Comments on the Indian commitlee
inspection report on Ihe hazarilous malerials onhoard the SS Blue Ladr. 31 July 2006
64 Inspection Committee Report p5, as cited by the NUO Plat!()fm on Shipbreaking 2006 op.eit.
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Following an inspection of the twelve decks of the 315metre long
ship in just some four hours in August 2006, the Atomic Energy
Regulatory Board (AERB) and the Gujarat Maritime Board (GMB) found
twelve smoke detectors containing radioactive materials and thereafter
declared the ship free of radioactive material, despite the fact that plans
showing the locations of more than one thousand further units was
available. This report was issued by the Technical Experts Committee
(TEC), the chairman of which was Secretary at the Environment Ministry.
Another principal factor accepted by the court was the statement
made by the TEC; that since the vessel was now grounded, this was an
'irreversible process' and the ship could no longer be refloated, a stance
rejected by more than one salvage company.65
On September 11 th 2007, claiming the issue to be a recurring one,
the Supreme Court gave judgement66 allowing the breaking of the Blue
Lady, in the face of its own order of October 14th 2003, its Direction
657/95, a number of international agreements, including Basel, which
India has ratified, India's own Environmental Protection Act, the absence
of an owner's inventory of hazardous material, the absence of the
mandatory Form F from the country of export, the absence of any pre-
contamination and the inability of Alang to dispose of materials such as
PCBs in the tightly defined and strictly controlled manner required by
convention. Advancing the "concept of balance"67 under the principle of
proportionality relating to sustainability, the court determined that no
development is possible without some adverse effect on the ecology and
environment and the convenience to the larger section of the people has to
get primacy.68 The breaking offered the prospect of work for 700 in the
breaking and the production of 41,000MT of scrap steel, this being
important in the face of competition from Bangladesh and China
With the decision made under pressure by the authorities, selective
logic and the avoidance of known facts, the workers of Alang began
stripping and dismantling up the Blue Lady on October 2007.
Developments in Guidelines and Convention
With the growing unease about conditions in today's major ship
breaking areas, a number of separate guidelines have been formulated,
65 G Krishna 2007 op.cit.
66 Judgement 11.9.2007 Order No.34 of 2006 in Writ Petition (civil) No. 657 of 1995
67 Citing the precedent of TN Godavarman Thirumalpad v Union ofIndia and Ors. (2002) sec 606
68 G Krishna 2007 Selling a precedent}or trafficking hazardous waste at www.indiatogether.org/cgi-
bin/tools/pffiend.cgi viewed 22.8.08
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each gIVing slightly differing coverage to the various aspects of the
operation. The common element of them all has been the voluntary
observance required by the shipping and breaking industries and the
emphasis laid upon the breakers for improvements.
The subject of ship breaking was brought to the IMO's Marine
Environmental Protection Committee (MEPe) by Norway in 1998. At the
MEPC's 46th session (March 2001) a Correspondence Group confirmed
the lack of any international framework for ship recycling practices, the
deficiencies in national regulations on environmental concerns, the health
and safety of workers and the enforcement of standards. The IMO's
primary role at that stage was recognised as dealing with ships before the
recycling process began by taking overall responsibility for aspects of ship
design, building and operations which might impact on recycling. It also
sought to establish technical guidelines and codes of conduct for
shipowners that would be internationally binding. At the 23 rd Assembly in
December 2003, the IMO formally adopted its Guidelines on Ship
Recycling,6'I a voluntary set of rules with a wide scope, covering ship
builders and owners through to intergovernmental bodies and ship
breakers. Included in the guidelines were provisions for a Green Passport,
an inventory of potentially hazardous materials included within the
structure and equipment at the time of construction. Intended to
accompany the ship throughout its life with necessary updates as required,
it is to provide a comprehensive detailing of hazards to be available for
those finally recycling the ship. However, a comprehensive listing of such
materials does not guarantee that the breaking operation will be carried out
in any way radically different from that of today.
These proposals were met with some disdain by BAN and
Greenpeace, who regarded them as a cynical ploy by the shipping industry
to usurp some of the Basel Convention by adopting a regime based on
lowest rather than highest common denominator, declaring:
... a precedent of allowing an industry to go "forum shopping"
within the "UN store" for the weakest international law available
threatens not only the future of the Basel Convention, but the
credibility of the entire UN system. 70
The guidelines are not compatible with Basel in that they still endorse the
export of hazardous waste. Although a number of conventions and
69 Resolution A.962(23)
70 BAN 2004 Briefing paper 5 The shame o[shipping: breaking the principle to break ships.
115
protocols are mentioned in the guidelines, the Basel Convention is not
amongst them.
In 2002, at the 6th meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP-6), the
Basel Convention adopted their own 'Technical guidelines for the
environmentally sound management of the full and partial dismantling of
ships,' 71 which it issued the following year. The guidelines restricted
themselves to the technical aspects of ship dismantling, but recognised the
IMO focus on the use of hazardous materials in ship construction and the
ILO involvement with occupational health and safety of workers in the
breakers' yard.
The International Labour Organisation is another UN agency, whose
concerns included since 2000 the health and safety of those working in the
ship breaking yards, rather than the shipping industry per se. In 2003, its
Governing Body charged the ILO to:
... draw up a compendium of best practice... leading to the
preparation of a comprehensive code on occupational health and
safety in shipbreaking, and that Governments should be
encouraged to require ships to have an inventory of hazardous
materials on board that is required throughout the life of the
vessel.. 72
The ILO subsequently issued its 'Safety and Health in Shipbreaking:
Guidelines for Asian countries and Turkey '73 at its 2891h session in March
2004. Aimed at both the shipbreakers and the competent authorities, the
guidelines provided help and guidance directly to improve working
conditions and developed minimum criteria in order that the facilities
might be ranked. Again the guidelines carried no legal force, nor were they
intended to replace national legislation, but were issued to complement
other provisions of the IMO, the ICS, and the range of existing
conventions and protocols.
In order to co-ordinate and rationalise the efforts of the various
organisations, a Joint ILO/IMO/BC Working Group on Ship Scrapping
was incorporated by the IMO and their first meeting took place in
February 2005, their efforts being fed into the Marine Environmental
7] Decision UNEP/CHw.6/L.1
72 Conclusion of the Tripartite Meeting on the Social and Labour Impact ofGlobalizatiol1 in the Manufacture or
Transport, endorsed by the ILO's Governing Body at its 27~th Session, November 2000.
73 International Labour OlIiee, Geneva. 2003 Interregional Tripartite Meeting of Experts on Sa1Cty and Health
in Shipbreaking for Selected Asian Countries and Turkey Bangkok, 7-14 October 2003
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Protection Committee (MEPC). In 2005 the MEPC agreed74 to develop a
new international instrument for both the shipping and the recycling
industries that would be legally binding. Design, construction, and
operation are to be included as well as provisions covering the preparation
of end-of-life ships for safe and environmentally sound recycling. New
provisions far formal assessment of ships prior to scrapping are contained
in proposed measures for a ready-far-recycling register and certificates of
approval for recycling sites. With regard to disposal itself, some
appropriate enforcement mechanism is to be incorporated for recycling
facilities based upon a system of certification and reporting, the whole
instrument to be completed for adoption in 2008-9. The Committee's
proposal was formally accepted at the IMO Assembly November-
December 2005. 75 At the same session, the Assembly also adopted further
enhancements to the existing Guidelines on Ship Recycling in terms of
requirements for inventories of potentially hazardous materials - the
Green Pas.~ports.76
In the anticipated response to the proposed measures, BAN
welcomed the attention to the environmental considerations in ship design
and construction that are not currently incorporated elsewhere77 and an
assessment of both ships and sites at the point of recycling. It is vociferous
in the apparent lack of concern within the proposals for the human rights
of those upon whom the environmental and health burdens fall, expecting
far more from a United Nations organisation, and with the failure to
strengthen in any way the "polluter pays" principle by addressing the roles
and responsibilities of flag states, states of registration of shipping
companies, and states of export of waste. It is of great concern that the
new convention does not become the alternative to the Basel Convention
as far as ships-far-disposal are concerned, but adds to the existing
convention by making the inclusion of such ships beyond question in the
definition of hazardous waste. Once accepted, the new convention may
take a further five or six years before it actually comes into force.
In 2006, a spokesman for the ICS warned that if pre-cleaning did
become mandatory (and thus replace what has hitherto been a good cash
income to shipowners with a large cost imposition), then ship owners
74 Marine Environmental Protection Committee 53rd session, Agenda item 3 MEPC 53/3/7
13 May 2005. Recycling of Ships. Proposal for an enforceable legally binding system for the recycling of ships
75 Assembly resolution A.9XI(24) New legallv binding instrument an ship recvcling.
76 Assemhly resolution A.962(23) Amendments to the IMO guidelines on ship recycling
77 BAN 2006 Critique ojdraftlMO "international conventionfor safe and environmentally sound rec)'cling of
ships ". Prepared bv the Base! Action Network on behaljojthe Global NGO Platfi)rm on Shipbreaking 16
March 2006
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might prefer to sell ships to non-OECD countries" a year before their life
ends" rather than pay for dismantling. "It's entirely possible - and legal."78
Other Developments
Not all proposals relate to the development of international
conventions. One aspect of the growing concern over the state of
shipbreaking has been the amalgamation of environmental pressure groups
that has been taking place. The Basel Action Network, together with the
ever-present Greenpeace organisation, has addressed directly many
gatherings of the lMO, lCS etc., with formal submissions for consideration
and responded publicly and in detail to the output of those bodies. Further
amalgamation has resulted in the joining of forces with other established
international organisations to form the Global NGO Platform on
Shipbreaking, an organisation that combines a growing number of voices
to counter the extensive judicial injustices that they recognise. 79
Concentrating more directly on the actual processes of shipbreaking
are the actions of a (as yet) small number of ship owners such as BP and
P&O Nederlloyd, who seek to take practical steps to improve the general
conditions, and hence the sustainability, of selected breaking sites.
Disturbed by the circumstances in which they saw one of their former
VLCCs being dismantled in Pakistan, BP now use sites in China, which
they deem to be more acceptable, and where operations are supervised by
BP staff and disposal of hazardous waste is audited. P&O similarly
stipulates that its vessels may now only be scrapped in two dry-docks
scrapping facilities in China. P&O goes further, in removing much
hazardous material from vessels prior to departure to China and in
providing protective equipment for the workers. so Although conditions and
practices at these sites may still be far from perfect, they do indicate a
rising improvement and importantly, one that comes from the owner side
of the shipping industry.
In a report issued in 200lfor the European Commission,s, on the
prospects for controlled shipbreaking, DNV concluded that the potential
for this activity to be carried out in European ports was very small.
78 ENDS 2006 ap.cit. p22
79 Members of the Global Platfonn include the Basel Action Network, Ban Asbestos, Bellona Europa,
European Federation of Transport and Environment, Greenpeacc, lntemational Federation of Human Rights and
others.
800 Graham-Rowe 2004 Breaking up is hard to do. Nature vol. 429 24.6.2004
81 Det Norske Veritas, Appledore International 2001 Technolof?Y and economicfeasihility study o(ship
scrapping in Europe. Final report no. 2000-3527
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Although Europe may not become the destination for the increasingly
large end-of-life tankers and container ships, there is, in addition to some
traditional sites in Belgium, Netherlands and Italy, embryonic growth to
augment existing facilities. In Holland, the Stitching Tanker Ontmanteling
Platform (STOP) planned a €45 million EcoDock at Eemshaven, where
heavy cutting machinery is utilised to scrap a ship in a fraction of the time,
whilst containing pollution within the dock. EcoDock, which subsequently
became Greendock, announced its intention to establish a range of 20
docks, mainly in Asia, including up to five docks initially in Thailand, and
then possibly in China Singapore and Cambodia.
In the UK, a number of former shipbuilders received licences to
operate shipbreaking operations, including Swan Hunter on Tyneside and
Harland and Wolff at Belfast. Able UK on Teesside was finally granted a
licence in June 2008. Other companies are considering applications. Able
is to start work on dismantling the four ex-US ships it imported in 2003
and Harland and Wolff began to break up the forward section of the
container ship Napoli, which ran aground off the Devon coast in January
2007. In September 2008, the former landing ship HMS Intrepid was
towed to Liverpool for dismantling - its sister ship having been towed to
Belgium for breaking the previous December.
Following the start of the protracted Able UK contest over licences,
the House of Commons Environment Committee called for a UK ship
dismantling industry to be established to end reliance on Asian shipyards
and published its report - Dismantling defunct ships82 - in November 2004.
This report was accepted by the government, and in 2007, a strategy was
released by the Environment Department (DEFRA), with particular
reference to Government-owned vessels, which will be sold for further use
only after a defined assessment has been undertaken. H] Alongside the
strategy, DEFRA has also issued guidance on ship recycling, with details
of technical and regulatory requirements for UK ship recycling facilities. 84
Whilst these may represent rather minor additions to worldwide
shipbreaking capacity, they do represent a move towards the direction in
which such activities should be undertaken.
The EU issued a Green Paper on maritime policy in June 2006 and
prioritised environmentally sound management of ship dismantling for the
82 Report of the HOllse or Commons Committee on Environment. Food and Rural AITairs 2004 Dismantling
Dejimct Ships in the UK. Eighteenth report 2003-4 session HC834 3.11.2004
83ENDS 2007 Ship re<ycling strategy sets minimum standard, Report 386 March 2007 p 44
84 DEFRA 2007. Overview o{ship recycling in the UK - guidance. February 2007
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European Union in the following November. x' Following the IMO
proposals for a shipbreaking convention, The EU then issued its own
proposals in the form of a Green Paper on better ship dismantling in
2007.86 Recognising the relative ease with which the EWSR can be
bypassed, the 2007 Green Paper called for much better enforcement in
European ports and the identification and targeting of ships likely to be at
or near the disposal state. It is stated quite clearly in the 2007 Green Paper
that the overall direction is to improve the protection of environmental and
human health worldwide, it is not intended to 'artificially bring back
recycling business to the EU, thus depriving countries in South Asia of a
major source of revenue.' 87
Whilst the proposed IMO convention discusses funding for the
various aspects of the introduction of the convention, provisions relating to
funding for the breakers appear almost as an after thought. The EU
proposes the development of a ship recycling fund but, in compliance with
EU legislation on restrictions on the use of public funding for subsidies,
such funding should be provided directly by the shipping industry and
those who have benefited from it, based on the principle of producer
responsibility, and similar to the MARPOL oil pollution funds. This
regime should be mandatory.88
Conclusions
Shipbreaking today is basically a sustainable industry, carried out in
unsustainable conditions. The industry is centred upon India, Bangladesh
and China, where it represents an important source of employment and of
resources, and where the level of recycling of ships and all their fittings
and equipment is carried out at a much higher than might be found
elsewhere.
Hazardous waste, however, follows the line of least resistance.
Shipping is very much a global industry but ship breaking is essentially a
national one, where the damage to human and environmental health is
extensive, but where any improvements in the provision and enforcement
of appropriate legislation is usually to the disadvantage of the centre
involved in terms of additional costs.
85 European Commission 2006 TOHlOrd\' afi/lure maritime [Jo/i(vfiJr the Union. A European visionfin' the
oceans and seas. Brussels COM(2006) 275 7.6.2006
86 Commission of the European Communities 2007 op.eil.
87 Commission of the European Community 2007 op.eit p3
88 Commission of the European Community 2007 op.eil pl5
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The present state of affairs hangs on three premises, the first of
which is the Basel convention's applicability to end-of-life ships, a matter
which is strongly contested by the shipping industry, as well as many of
the owners of the breaking yards (but not by the EU legislators). Secondly,
the point at which a ship eventually becomes waste is easily hidden and
may only be declared once a ship is at sea and beyond various
jurisdictions. Thirdly, actual ownership of end-of-life ships is often
deliberately obscured, especially via the numerous open register states.
There is a growing international concern over this state of affairs, whereby
ship owners, who have profited from the employment of vessels over the
years, may now relinquish their responsibilities for the hazardous wastes
that such vessels represent and the damage to human and environmental
health that their dismantling elsewhere entails. The call for change was led
initially by environmental pressure groups, but has been joined more
recently by certain governments and a token few ship owners, and this is
finally, but slowly, starting to make a mark through new and growing
practices and legal precedence.
Michael Galley
Southampton Solent University
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